Pakistan sits across a geological belt that stretches from Central Asia through Afghanistan into western China – a zone known to host some of the world’s most commercially significant copper, gold, rare metals, and industrial minerals.

From the Chagai copper belt in Balochistan to iron ore, antimony, barite, and bauxite deposits in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan occupies a region of strategic significance for global mineral supply chains. What it lacks is not geology, but a system capable of converting that geology into bankable, export-oriented projects.

Unlike China or even India, the United States is not a large importer of raw mineral ores. It still produces substantial copper, iron ore, and industrial minerals domestically, and increasingly relies on recycling, secondary processing, and strategic stockpiles to reduce exposure to volatile global markets. What Washington is really seeking is secure, diversified upstream supply for future technologies – clean energy, defence electronics, batteries, and grid infrastructure – where geopolitical reliability matters more than short-term price.

That is where Pakistan quietly enters the picture. For the US, South and Central Asia are emerging as a potential alternative to over-concentrated supply chains dominated by China, Latin America, and parts of Africa. Afghanistan’s copper and lithium, Pakistan’s copper and industrial minerals, and Central Asia’s metals together form a contiguous mineral geography that could, in theory, anchor a new, geopolitically balanced supply corridor. Mineral development in this region is not just about extraction; it is also about stability, trade connectivity, and long-term regional peace. But for that corridor to exist, Pakistan must become the anchor: the country with ports, legal systems, energy infrastructure, and financial credibility capable of turning regional mineral wealth into globally tradable, responsibly produced materials. So far, Pakistan has yet to achieve this.

Washington’s supply-chain problem

The United States is racing to re-engineer its mineral supply chains. Copper is now the backbone of renewable electricity grids, electric vehicles, data centres, and defence electronics. Lithium, antimony, and rare earths feed batteries, semiconductors, and missile systems. Barite is critical for energy drilling. Bauxite underpins aluminium used in aerospace and transport. Iron ore anchors industrial manufacturing.

What worries Washington is not availability but concentration. China dominates rare-earth processing. Chile and Peru control much of global copper. Indonesia shapes nickel markets. Parts of Africa hold most of the cobalt and lithium. This concentration leaves the US exposed to geopolitical leverage, price shocks, and supply disruptions. Diversification is, therefore, a strategic necessity – and Pakistan’s geography, sitting between Central Asia, the Gulf, and South Asia, offers a rare opportunity to help create it.

Why Pakistan keeps losing to its peers

Yet geography alone does not win investment. India, which has a smaller copper and gold endowment than Pakistan, attracts far more downstream mineral capital because it offers stable licensing, predictable taxation, and enforceable contracts. Chile and Peru succeed because their legal systems make mining financeable. Even African states with weaker infrastructure draw more mining capital than Pakistan because investors know where they stand. In Pakistan, they do not.

Licences change mid-project. Royalty regimes are renegotiated after investments are sunk. Environmental approvals can be reversed by new governments. Provincial authorities prioritise short-term royalty extraction over long-term project viability. Courts and arbitration move slowly and unpredictably. Mining is a 30-40-year endeavour, yet Pakistan’s governance often reflects a short-term political horizon.

The dollar problem

American investors think in dollars, not rupees. Yet most Pakistani mining structures generate local-currency revenues while costs, financing, and dividends are dollar-linked. Even technically successful mines become financially unstable when the rupee depreciates. Countries that attract serious mining capital do not ignore this risk. They manage it through export-based dollar revenues, currency-protected structures, and internationally bankable offtake agreements. Pakistan largely does not.

A critical gap exists between discovery and development. High-quality geological surveys, resource estimation, and feasibility studies are expensive, time-consuming, and technically demanding. Pakistan has historically underfunded these essential steps, leaving local miners unable to carry them out and without meaningful state support to bridge the gap. Research and development – the backbone of turning raw mineral potential into bankable projects – is largely absent. As a result, investors are offered prospects, not fully engineered, export-ready projects – speculation instead of commercially viable, investable assets. Global capital does not invest in hope – it invests in engineering.

Why US interest is rising anyway

Despite these structural gaps, Washington’s interest in Pakistan’s minerals is genuine and growing. US strategic agencies see South and Central Asia as a potential alternative to concentrated supply chains, and Pakistan’s copper, antimony, barite, and iron ore are critical for defence, clean energy, and infrastructure projects. American firms are scouting, mapping and talking – but not committing. They are waiting for Pakistan to prove that it can protect capital as reliably as it protects sovereignty.

Their hesitation sends a clear message: geology alone is insufficient. Only a domestic system that underwrites exploration, resource certification, and commercially engineered projects can transform Pakistan’s mineral potential into secure, internationally trusted investment. If Pakistan wants US mineral investment, it must stop selling rocks and start selling systems. Mining-focused industrial clusters with dollar-linked exports, guaranteed repatriation, contractual enforcement, and international arbitration would transform capital-readiness. Federal-provincial coordination must replace fragmented authority. Environmental and social compliance should be legally binding, not cosmetic. Corporate social responsibility must be contractual, ensuring local communities gain lasting benefits. Above all, projects must be structured to survive political change.

The United States does not lack interest in Pakistan’s minerals. It lacks confidence in Pakistan’s capital-readiness in mining. Until that changes, exploration teams will keep arriving, reports will keep being written – and capital will keep flowing elsewhere.

Pakistan’s mineral wealth could anchor its export economy, support regional stability, and place it at the centre of tomorrow’s global supply chains. But in the modern world, geology creates opportunity – systems create investment, and Washington is still waiting for Pakistan to build one. Economic security is the new frontier of national strength; a nation that guards its borders must also safeguard the confidence that turns opportunity into lasting progress.

The writer is a PhD and former executive director general, Board of Investment, PM Office; public policy & corporate law expert